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THE END OF A DOCTRINE

by Kiyoshi K. Kawakami

China's Communists are on the march. Its recognized government is fighting with its back to the wall. Washington is at a loss to know whether or how it could or should save the day for Chiang Kai-shek. Once more, China "is in the devil's own mess", as John Hay, Secretary of State under McKinley, said in 1900.

History shows that whoever controls North China eventually controls the entire country. In the present instance, the Communists' mastery of North China and their southward advance have been facilitated by their acquisition of Manchuria. This was made possible through Soviet aid, open and clandestine.

No wonder that Mao Tse-tung, head of Red China, on November 11, the 31st anniversary of the Russian Revolution, wired Stalin saying: "We . . . hail close co-operation between the peoples of China and Soviet Russia". This is the same man whom many Americans have wishfully described as an agrarian reformer; not a Communist.

The tragedy is that none of these developments were foreseen by President Roosevelt and his entourage. On February 12, 1945, at Yalta, the President acceded to Stalin's demand for the virtual cession of not merely Port Arthur but also adjacent territory of some 1300 square miles, enough room for a large army. Also surrendered to the Soviet were the Manchurian railways including the 900-mile Eastern Chinese line. Russia, in 1935, had sold this line to Japanese-sponsored Manchukuo for the tidy sum of 140 million yen, plus retirement funds for its Russian employees.

The Yalta deal killed China's last chance of regaining Manchuria, and it killed the Open Door doctrine; keystone of American diplomacy since 1900. Had Mr. Roosevelt possessed some knowledge of the history of that doctrine he might not have abandoned it so readily.

II

The Open Door doctrine was defined in two circular letters addressed by John Hay to the Powers interested in China. In the first letter, dated September 6, 1899, Mr. Hay advocated equality of commercial opportunity for all nations, even where the Powers had established special spheres for their own benefit. The second letter, dated July 3, 1900, urged upon the Powers the preservation of "Chinese territorial and

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administrative entity" as well as "the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of China". (See Manchuria and the Open Door, by Felix Morley, HUMAN EVENTS, September 5, 1945.)

Although the first letter is generally identified with the Open Door, the second is more truly expressive of the spirit and intent of that doctrine. For spheres of interest, which the first letter tacitly recognized, were incompatible with equal opportunity. The Powers which established such spheres invariably adopted discriminatory measures against other nations.

The occasion for the second letter was China's confusion, worse confounded by the Boxer disturbance of 1900. Taking advantage of this situation, the European Powers embarked upon a free-for-all scramble for Chinese territory. Of these would-be land grabbers Russia was the most audacious. Pouring troops into Manchuria, Russia seemed intent upon squatting there for good. (See A Comparison with 1900, by Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, HUMAN EVENTS, March 6, 1946.)

Yet when Hay reminded St. Petersburg of the Open Door principle, to which Russia had subscribed, he received, in his own words, "a reply, most positive and satisfactory, that their [Russian] occupation [of Manchuria] was military and temporary".

Thus was the Hay doctrine accepted by all Powers. True, none was sincere; all, especially Russia, violated it at will. But, on paper at least, all committed themselves to the Open Door, and that was something by no means insignificant. The United States, for its part, was, in Hay's own language, determined "to hold on like grim death to the Open Door". As William Roscoe Thayer says, Hay "made a magnificent bluff -- which the United States could not have backed up if it had been called -- and he won".

III

Mr. Roosevelt, when confronted by Stalin at Yalta, was in a much stronger position to make a "magnificent bluff" than was Hay when the Secretary of State faced single-handed an array of Great Powers. More accurately, the President was in a position to call Stalin's bluff. At that late hour, when Germany was reeling under Allied blows, Stalin would not have made a separate peace with Hitler. As for Stalin's declaring war upon Japan, as desired by Mr. Roosevelt, he would have done that anyway for the gains he was eager to secure.

Russia, once in the Pacific war, would under any circumstances have entrenched itself in Manchuria and proceeded to fortify Port Arthur.

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Even so, if Mr. Roosevelt had not made the United States accessory to the fact in the spoliation of Manchuria, Washington could still have had the Open Door to rely upon in countering the Soviet encroachments.

One of the purposes of the Hay doctrine was to keep America's hands clean, so that Washington could with a clear conscience point a reproaching finger at any Power violating China's integrity. America's non-recognition policy towards Manchukuo, a potent policy which proved Japan's eventual undoing, stemmed from the same doctrine. Yet Mr. Roosevelt cut ground from under the Open Door, and forfeited America's moral right to contest acts and policies calculated to undermine that principle. The United States conceded to Stalin the very encroachments for which Japan promoted the Mukden "incident" of 1931, followed by the creation of Manchukuo as a Japanese puppet State.

China, upon Mr. Roosevelt's advice, was forced to implement the Yalta agreement, made behind her back. In the resultant Sino-Russian treaty of August 14, 1945, Russia, having exacted vast concessions from China, made these promises:

(1) To give Chiang Kai-shek's government, and not the Communist regime, "moral and material assistance";
(2) To recognize Manchuria as "an inseparable part" of China;
(3) To withdraw troops from Manchuria by December 2, 1945;
(4) To set up a board of five Chinese and five Soviet members to administer the Manchurian railways, in which Russia obtained a half interest;
(5) To let the Chinese police guard the railways;
(6) To allow China, jointly with Russia, the use of Port Arthur;
(7) To make Dairen, one of the greatest modern ports in the Far East, a free port open to trade and shipping of all nations;
(8) To let Chinese officials administer the city of Dairen, although its port was to be controlled by a Russian director.

None of these pledges have been honored. Not until May 31, 1946, did the Soviet troops withdraw entirely from Manchuria. Even then the withdrawal was nominal, for many of the troops went to the leased territory of which Port Arthur and Dairen are only small parts. Instead of helping Chiang Kai-shek's government to regain Manchuria, Russia facilitated Communist infiltration of that territory, and let the Reds help themselves to the arms left behind by the Japanese. Chinese officials were barred from railway administration. The railways were closed to the transportation of Chiang Kai-shek's troops.

Now Moscow has given the Red puppet regime in Manchuria a de facto recognition and concluded monopolistic trade agreements with it. Port Arthur is closed to Chiang Kai-shek's troop ships. Dairen is closed to

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all foreign nations including China. The American consul there is a virtual prisoner allowed to communicate with Washington and the American Ambassador in China only via Vladivostok, where the security of confidential diplomatic documents cannot be guaranteed. Last but not least, Russia carried away most of the Japanese industrial assets which had made Manchuria China's El Dorado.

IV

In December, 1946, Mr. Edwin W. Pauley, American representative on the Reparations Commission, after a tour of inspection through South Manchuria, reported to President Truman that the damage done to China by Soviet removals of Japanese industrial plants and equipment amounted to an estimated $858 million and that, considering replacement cost and deterioration, $2 billion would be a conservative estimate of the loss inflicted upon the Nanking Government.

On December 19, 1947, an American naval vessel arrived at Dairen with diplomatic mail and food and other necessaries to be delivered to the American Consulate General there. It was allowed by the Soviet military commander, Major General V. U. Korzhanoff, to remain in the harbor for only 48 hours.

While the United States Consul General was striving to obtain Soviet permission for an American businessman and an American newspaper correspondent to go ashore, the time limit expired, and the Red commander brusquely issued a verbal ultimatum to the captain of the naval ship, saying in effect: Leave within twenty minutes, or we shall not be responsible for what may happen. The captain swallowed his pride and departed, taking back with him the businessman and the newspaper correspondent, else there might have been an unpleasant incident.

In the face of all these arbitrary measures taken by the Soviet Government, what has Washington done?

In February, 1946, Secretary Brynes reminded Moscow -- and Nanking -- that Japanese industrial assets in Manchuria are a matter to be discussed at a peace conference. In December, 1947, another note went forth to Moscow -- and Nanking -- deploring the "current unsatisfactory situation" in regard to Dairen. Why to Nanking?

In either note one looks in vain for a ringing invocation of the Open Door. Yalta had muted the historic doctrine. A pillar of American Foreign Policy had fallen; the Soviet seizure of China followed fast.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events November 24, 1948



By Frank C. Hanighen

During the past week many Members of Congress have returned to their offices on Capitol Hill -- the defeated to pack up, the victors to clear their desks. Two questions, in particular, stir discussion among Republican Members: (1) What are the chances for 1952? (2) Will Dewey remain as real leader of the Party? The first is answered consolingly by assurances that a depression will come during the next four years. This depression -- it is asserted with grim satisfaction -- will not only defeat the Democrats, but will remain for years as a Democratic liability, just as the unhappy situation in 1932 has plagued the Republicans. This much may be said for the thesis. Left Wing Democrats have argued for the past two years that a Republican victory in 1948 would prove a boon; the GOP would then bear responsibility for a depression which, claimed these Left Wingers, is inevitable before 1952. Much of this thinking was behind the Justice Douglas boom; his supporters really hoped for, not nomination this year, but election in 1952. There is, however, a rebuttal to this "sure-depression" argument. With the Garrison State upon us now, it is difficult to see why the Truman Administration with all controls and spending in its hands, can't avoid or drastically temper any economic recession which may occur.

There is only one current Republican answer to the question "Will Dewey retain the leadership?" That is a roaring "No". So widespread and bitter is the feeling against Dewey that a showdown is expected at the January meeting of the National Committee (if not before that). It is anticipated that the Committee will elect a new Chairman who quite definitely will not be a Dewey man. Sentiment has gone so far that the name of such extremely anti-Dewey leaders as Carroll Reece and Governor Duff are seriously mentioned.

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Heard on the Hill. They are still talking about the election, and some of their more temperate observations are interesting. For instance, one defeated Republican from a western district which is about two-thirds rural, one-third urban, told how the battle was lost. He said that the Labor machine in the urban area produced its usual vote, no more, no less; also there was important absenteeism in his middle class precincts. But the farmers were either discontented with the Congressman (he had been cool towards price supports, and outspokenly against REA); or they were chilly towards Mr. Dewey. In any case, they stayed away from the polls in large numbers -- and that, said the Congressman, defeated him. An opponent of Dewey, this man ventures the opinion that if the New York Governor had campaigned only half as diligently as Truman in the farming areas, he would have won.

Reinforcing the growing opinion that the farm vote was the decisive factor is the experience of an Eastern Congressman. His constituency is composed almost entirely of industrial workers and middle class commuters, with virtually no farm vote. This Congressman, a Republican, retained his seat by a very large majority, rivalling that of the landslide of 1946. He naturally minimizes the Labor vote as a decisive factor in the national election and favors the view that the rural vote "did it".

Then there is the case of Congressman James E. Van Zandt of the 22nd Pennsylvania district. This Republican kept his seat by the largest majority in his career. His constituency is about half rural, half urban, the latter containing a large number of Labor union members. Van Zandt not only had voted for the Taft-Hartley Act, but vigorously defended his position on the Act in the campaign. Those who know say that Van Zandt's intensive and courageous campaigning turned the trick.

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The post-election "I-told-you-so" folk are at it. Various would-be prophets appear with reminders of what they said last January, or before, about a sure Truman victory. Oddly enough, they boast less about what they said in October; or if their October text is available it reveals no confidence that Truman would win. The Washington Evening Star was one of those papers which incorrectly predicted a Dewey election. But the Star has the last laugh.

On November 19, its editor printed a letter from Harold L. Ickes, in which the famous Ickes' temper was liberally vented against the pro-Dewey Star -- on the score of sound reporting. The Star editor, however, took his revenge on the Ickes school of journalism by reprinting a column by Ickes which appeared November 7 in the Panama Star Herald. Of course, Harold had written it before November 2, and of course his syndicate had effectively killed it in all papers -- save one. Perhaps maliciously, the Panama paper ran it. Here is the pre-election expectation of Honest Harold: "As the only President by Chance", wrote the Ick, "who was able to win a nomination at the end of his fragmentary term and then be defeated at the succeeding election, Truman has made a new record. One cannot but admire the game fight he put up. We Americans love a good fighter and a good loser. President Truman has been both. One may regret that he did not have about him, or at least within counselling distance, advisers who were able coolly to appraise the situation and frankly tell him he could not win."

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Observers who stress the decisive role of the farm vote in the Truman election victory minimize the "Government payroll vote". They point to some very impressive evidence presented by Alex S. Preston in the Washington Star (November 21). Mr. Preston, in a long, statistical article, begins by saying that the Census Bureau has designated a portion of the area surrounding the District of Columbia as the Washington Metropolitan District (legal residents of the District of Columbia have no vote). The area has a total population of 1,205,220 and an estimated two out of every five employed persons work for the Government. These Government workers total 219,639. The portion of this district which has the largest concentration of Federal employees is Arlington, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington. Arlington County voted for Dewey 10,774 to Truman's 7,798. Twenty-three of Arlington County's twenty-four precincts went for Dewey. "Politicians", reports Mr. Preston, "are still shaking their heads trying to figure out why Arlington as a whole, and particularly the precincts dominated or largely influenced by Government worker concentrations voted for Governor Dewey".

Nearby Fairfax County, Virginia (part of which is in the Washington Metropolitan District), gave Dewey 4,927 as against only 3,719 for Truman. Montgomery County, Maryland (also in the W.M.D.), gave Dewey 23,174; Truman, 14,336. In that county all the precincts adjacent to the District of Columbia went for Dewey -- that is, in Bethesda, Chevy Chase, Silver Spring, Takoma Park, etc. Prince Georges County, Maryland, also a Government employee area, went for Truman by a photo-finish: Truman, 14,874; Dewey, 14,718. (Mr. Preston points out that this county's registration listed 29,960 Democrats, only 12,443 Republicans.) Precincts adjacent to the District of Columbia voted as did the rest of the county. Alexandria, Virginia, also in the Washington Metropolitan District, went Truman by the narrow margin of 14 votes out of 7,800 cast. "Virtually a tie", remarks Mr. Preston. Mr. Preston comes to the conclusion that the returns in these areas "refute" the argument that "Washington would always vote for the predominant party because so many persons depend on the Federal payroll".

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The future of the House Un-American Activities Committee has inspired much discussion since the election. One straw in the wind is noted in the resolutions of the American Federation of Labor, voted in last week's Convention at Cincinnati. The New York Times (Late City edition, page 47, November 21) reported: "While the Convention favored the purposes for which the House Committee on Un-American Activities was created it omitted suggesting continuation of that committee. Instead it adopted a proposal that Congress create a Committee on National Security, whose responsibilities would include close contact with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

What this is intended to mean is the formation of an American counterpart of the Royal Canadian Commission (and of the Royal Commissions in Britain) which performed an excellent investigation of and report on the Red spy network in that country. The Commission would be bipartisan and composed of various public figures, both in and out of the Government. If such a Commission receives right of free access to Department of Justice files, as well as files of all other Departments, much progress might be made. But membership of the Commission must be of high quality and should not include anyone unsympathetic to the mission involved. There is no guarantee that the White House selection of members would uniformly meet these qualifications. Congress, which would presumably pass on all Executive nominations to the Commission, would have to be extremely vigilant.

If such a Commission is created, no little credit will be due to Mr. Benjamin Mandel, one of the members of the staff of the present House Committee. It is reported that he framed the AFL proposal and it is known that he has been in close contact with the AFL for some years. Indeed, AFL circles are now boosting him for Counsel, or Chief Investigator, for the proposed Commission, or for a key post on the House Committee if it is continued.

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General de Gaulle's anti-German outburst last week undoubtedly proved popular among the French people. However, quite a contrary note has been appearing in the Paris daily Le Monde. That paper is often described as "semi-official" and is regarded as the mouthpiece of Foreign Office views. Here is one example of its line, actually proposing a Franco-German alliance. "General de Gaulle's solution" remarked Le Monde, "rests on two principles, easy to formulate but not to apply: control of the Ruhr and the decentralization of Germany. These principles apply if one assumes that Germany is the main danger to France and Europe, and recent centuries seem to support this with evidence. . . .

"It would theoretically be very nice to revive the little German principalities and the folklore enthusiasts would certainly rejoice. But Germany today has too much feeling of its own unity for such a division to endure. It would have to be maintained by a permanent system of violence and control which would engender a nationalist reaction. Such a system is all the more absurd because it rests on a false base. Germany was the principal danger for a France in a Europe practically isolated from the rest of the world. This is no longer so in a world where Europe has become a prey over which America and Russia are disputing. Servitude to either the police system of Russia, or to American capitalism, that is the great danger to Europe. And this menace hangs over Germany as over France and all the nations of the old continent whose solid union is the sole hope for safety. The essential error of General de Gaulle's solution is that it is placed in the framework of the ancient Franco-German struggle, whereas actually today a Franco-German alliance is the first condition of the survival of Europe."

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Book Events

What Is Man, by C.-F. Ramuz; translation by Gouverneur Paulding; Introduction by Albert Beguin. New York: Pantheon Books. $2.75. Reviewed by J. M. Lalley.

The Swiss writer, Charles-Ferdinand Ramuz, possessed one of the great talents of his generation; but until about a year ago, when a translation of his novel, Derborence, was distributed by one of the great book clubs, he was virtually unknown to American readers. For that matter he was long neglected in Europe, although more than a full generation ago the quality of his work had been recognized and acknowledged by such contemporaries as Peguy and Claudel. But before his death Ramuz had attained to a considerable popularity in his own country and in France, and had begun to exert a strong influence on the work and thought of younger writers.

The present book is a compilation from his reflections on the great moral and political disorders of our times, published in the 1930s. Ramuz approached these problems as an artist rather than a philosopher. The great and pandemic sickness of modernity, he believed, is intellectualism, meaning the attempt to live by abstract ideas rather than by nature and by the values of direct experience. "Ideas", he wrote, "are the occupational disease of the great cities, which an over-civilization has set apart from the wholeness of life". Ideas are not shaped out of the necessities of personal existence, but come to us ready-made to be adopted and discarded as occasion and interest may require. Thus to the peasant working in collaboration with nature, studying her ways and moods, and to the craftsman working in intimacy with his materials and transmitting to them in his own emotions, Ramuz contrasts the artifical and unnatural life of the rationalistic bourgeois. The great evil of rationalism is the fission it produces in the soul, the separation of the individual from the human being. Individuality is what distinguishes a man from other men; humanity is what all men share, such as their physical needs, the knowledge of their mortality, the hunger for beauty, and the longing for some sense of grandeur that will give meaning and dignity to their sufferings.

The paradox of bourgeois rationalism, Ramuz tells us, is that by making man an end in himself, it has deprived him of a role in the universe. Where the values of reason and science are substituted for those of faith and emotion, man finds himself plunged into that "terrifying abyss where numbers progress in both directions toward that total absence of finality which we call the infinite and in relation to which the greatest as well as the smallest numbers lose all significance". In such a universe he becomes acutely and cruelly aware of his unimportance. In his relation to the totality of things he is virtually nothing. And because in such a universe all values are quantitative, a man must interpret his relationships to other men in terms of relative measurements or computations. It is for this reason that Communism is the natural and logical end of bourgeois rationalism. By quantitative calculation a man may discover that he has nothing while others have plenty, and that those who, like himself, have nothing are many, while those who have much are few. The bourgeois abstraction of man established an ideal of life which only few may realize; but the Communist abstraction establishes an ideal of perfect uniformity more suitable to a universe which is itself no more than a sum of quantities and each man no more than a social integer. The Communist ontology, in short, deprives men of both humanity and individuality, and this accounts for the hatred of nature which is characteristic of Communist thought; for where Communism insists on uniformity nature is variform. This is why Communism in action strives to separate men from all direct contact with nature, which it considers an enemy to be conquered and enslaved. But what the Communists overlook, says Ramuz, is that man himself, being part of nature, must in the end rebel against an unnatural existence.

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